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Executive Summary 
 
A gap exists in understanding the role of accountability (including audit and performance 
management) and transparency arrangements for different local public service bodies in the 
context of austerity. To address the gap the National Audit Office (NAO) is developing an 
evaluative framework to inform its value for money work on the financial sustainability of local 
public service bodies in England. To support this work, this comparative report looks at the 
interaction between accountability and transparency arrangements and austerity for local public 
services in England including local government, fire and rescue, police, and healthcare. The report 
found considerable variations in current arrangements and as a result considerable scope for 
potential improvements. 
 
Key Words: Accountability, Transparency, Audit, Performance Management, Regulation, 
Local Public Service Bodies, England 
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Section 1 Introduction 
  
Since the global financial crisis in 2008, relations between central government and local public 
service bodies in England have been dominated by austerity and the implications for budgets and 
performance. Shortly after taking office in 2010, the Coalition government announced the 
abolition of the Audit Commission, a body that had been involved in financial audit and 
performance management arrangements for local public service bodies such as local government, 
fire and rescue, police and health services since the early 1980s. In its place, the government 
introduced a host of new accountability arrangements and transferred some of the Audit 
Commission’s duties to the NAO. However, these reforms coincided with the introduction of 
austerity measures, which resulted in significant funding reductions and structural changes to the 
way local public service bodies operate. This in turn has raised a considerable number of specific 
issues around financial sustainability, value for money and assurance of local public service 
bodies, and particularly questions around accountability and transparency arrangements.  
 
As such, a gap exists in understanding the role of accountability (including audit and performance 
management) and transparency arrangements for different local public service bodies in the 
context of austerity. To address the gap the NAO is seeking to develop a generic evaluative 
framework to inform its value for money work on the financial sustainability of local public 
service bodies in England.  
 
To support this work, the NAO has commissioned this comparative review of literature and 
practice, which provides an overview of the role of audit and assurance regimes for different local 
public service bodies in the context of austerity. The purpose of this report is to focus on the 
interaction between accountability and transparency arrangements and austerity for local public 
services in England. 
 
Section 1 has provided an introduction. Following that, the report will look at each of four local 
public services or sectors separately. Section 2 will cover local government, section 3 will cover 
fire and rescue services, section 4 will cover local police bodies, and section 5 will cover local 
healthcare.  
 
Sections 2-5 will be structured around key themes and questions for comparative purposes. The 
themes will include accountability and transparency arrangements; information and its 
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interrogation; governance, leadership and strategic alignment; reporting, scrutiny and 
intervention; and potential value for money risks.  
 
Section 6 will draw lessons from each of these sectors together, by setting out their key themes, 
commonalities and differences, concluding with an overview of the report’s key findings. The 
findings will detail that there is considerable variation in current arrangements and as a result 
considerable scope for potential improvements. Some of the main points that will be made are: 
 
• The accountability and transparency arrangements differ between the public bodies and 
the development of any generic evaluative framework will need to reflect or allow for 
the significant differences and nuanced complexities of the organisations in the 
different sectors. 
• Since 2010 the audit arrangements mainly focus on financial conformance rather than 
operational performance. 
• Over the same period central government reforms primarily aimed to increase the 
transparency of local bodies. 
• The decline in the production of performance management information across the 
public bodies (with the exception of the health service) makes it difficult to assess value 
for money is being achieved and reflected in decision making. 
• The risk profile of public bodies has changed, due to a number of factors not least from 
budgetary constraints, and service delivery becoming more reliant on more diverse 
partnerships and joint working arrangements (and volunteer assistance). 
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Section 2 Local Government 
 
This section on Local Government covers:  
• review of accountability and transparency literature,  
• accountability and transparency arrangements,  
• information and its interrogation,  
• governance, leadership and strategic alignment,  
• reporting, scrutiny and intervention, and  
• potential value for money risks. 
 
2.1 Review of Accountability and Transparency Literature 
 
Power and control is contested in central and local government relations over service 
determination, performance management and funding arrangements (Rhodes, 1981, 1999; 
Wilson and Game, 2011).  
 
During the 1980’s to 2010 successive central governments (Conservative and New Labour) 
centralized accountability arrangements through the Audit Commission, audit, and 
performance management regimes including Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT), Best 
Value, Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) and Comprehensive Area Assessment 
(CAA) (Seal, 1999, 2003; Seal and Ball, 2005, 2006, 2011). In particular, studies have looked 
at the performance improvement potential of CPA (Woods and Grubnic, 2008; Murphy, 
Greenhalgh and Jones, 2011), and more specifically at the Use of Resources assessments that 
formed part of both CPA and CAA (Abu Hasan, Frecknall Hughes, Heald and Hodges, 2013). 
In addition, more broadly research has looked at how competition was manufactured through 
rankings (Kornberger and Carter, 2010). 
 
There has also been a gradual centralisation of funding that has not abated since the poll tax 
was withdrawn in the early 1990’s, and England has become the country with the most central 
control over local government funds of the major Western European Countries (Ferry, 
Eckersley and van Dooren, 2015). 
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Since 2010, the Conservative led Coalition Government has embraced a policy of ‘austerity 
localism’ (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012), and undertaken governing and budgeting for deficit 
reduction through changes to the spending reviews, budget, and audit and accountability 
arrangements (Ferry and Eckersley, 2011, 2012, 2015a). For example, reforms such as the 
Localism Act 2011 have given Local Authorities (LAs) greater autonomy over spending 
decisions but not local revenue generation. Other changes have seen the abolition of the Audit 
Commission and the abandonment of performance management frameworks and performance 
audit that has meant that LAs are less concerned with service outputs and outcomes than was 
previously the case (Timmins and Gash, 2014).  
 
The Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 confirmed that future LA audits would be 
overseen centrally by the NAO and focus solely on financial management, but have no 
performance assessment (Ellwood, 2014). This makes ‘financial conformance’ rather than 
‘operational performance’ the overriding focus, and ostensibly weakens local accountability 
because it obscures the potential impact of austerity cuts (Ferry and Eckersley, 2015a). Partly, 
the accountability deficit for performance at an ‘individual’ LA level is addressed through the 
NAO (2014) value for money report on ‘financial sustainability’ but the lack or inadequacy of 
performance information available to use, makes assessing the value for money aspects of 
financial sustainability an increasing challenge (if even a realistic prospect!). In some ways the 
NAO are essentially reduced to highlighting the risks that certain LAs may not be able to set a 
balanced budget or fulfil statutory duties, potentially leading to central government 
intervention.  
 
The NAO can, and do, also raise very important public accountability concerns such as that the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) do not have the arrangements in 
place to monitor how funds transferred to other Whitehall departments are employed, or how 
well LAs utilize their allocations. Essentially, the new accountability and audit arrangements 
let us know if the DCLG and LAs are spending within budget, but not what value the public 
are getting for their money.  
 
In addition, in a wider sense, changing delivery mechanisms have created much more complex 
accountability relationships (Shaoul, Shepherd, Stafford and Stapleton, 2013; NAO 2014), and 
LAs have recognised that their traditional organisational remit and funding arrangements have 
to change thus altering the risk profile (Ferry, Coombs and Eckersley, in press).  
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The transparency agenda led to ministerial claims that ‘armchair auditors’ would fill the 
accountability void created by the closure of the Audit Commission and the abandonment of 
performance audit although, as yet there is no systematic evidence of their impact or even of 
their existence. To the contrary informal, anecdotal and ad hoc investigations of contemporary 
use of Freedom of Information requests suggest the continuing dominance of unsophisticated 
inquiries from members of the public and continuing use by the media in association with 
publicity driven campaigns, an experience which mirrors similar experience in the USA. The 
result is that LAs are not robustly assessed on the quality of service outputs and outcomes 
(Eckersley, Ferry and Zakaria, 2014). This combined with austerity has reinforced the principle 
that holding down input costs through an over-riding focus on budgetary stewardship is the 
most important managerial objective within LAs, which means that there is very little scope 
for officers to innovate or try new ideas (Ferry, Coombs and Eckersley, in press).  
 
In effect, the transparency agenda forms mere apologia and is no substitute for the 
accountability that can be afforded by independent professional auditors assessing performance 
(Ferry, Eckersley and Zakaria, 2015). However, it is important to caution here that this need 
not always be the case as context and culture can play a role alongside other contingent 
variables (See Hood and Heald, 2006; Hood, 2010; Etzioni, 2014; Ferry and Eckersley, 2015b). 
 
Although the public do not appear to be ready to embrace the auditor role on spent funds, policy 
contestation is being influenced and in some cases changed through social movements, political 
protests, citizen participation and other bottom up grassroots initiatives (Ball and Seal, 2005), 
especially under the recent austerity localism that led to various co-option strategies (Ahrens 
and Ferry, in press).   
 
Furthermore, with regards to local governance, research has found production of data is deeply 
entangled in the modes and means of its production (Wilson et al 2011, Wilson et al 2013). 
There is a 'moral economy' of information as it is not 'just' data and therefore who is accounting 
for what, to whom, and in what context is a key question that cannot be sidestepped. The role 
of the view from somewhere rather than a presumption that somehow an artificial and objective 
view from nowhere can be formulated is problematic and it has to be acknowledged that 
information if it is to have utility to communities of place, or be of interest, needs to be 
interpreted (Cornford et al. 2013). 
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In summary, accountability arrangements in local government in England have reduced and 
not been adequately replaced by transparency initiatives. Research from elsewhere however 
suggests that over the longer term some performance information use will be re-introduced as 
financial stress eases and the focus once again shifts to value for money and not merely cutback 
management (Raudla, Savi, and Liedemann, 2013; Moynihan 2008; Wildavsky 1975. 
 
2.2 Accountability and Transparency Arrangements 
 
The Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament for the local government service in 
England, and is supported in this stewardship role by the DCLG. The DCLG Accounting 
Officer is accountable to Parliament for the stewardship of resources allocated to LAs and the 
Greater London Authority (GLA). There are processes for the Accounting Officer at DCLG to 
provide assurance to Parliament that grants made by the DCLG are properly accounted for by 
LAs, ensuring regularity, propriety and value for money.  
 
Other central government departments that provide funding to LAs also have Accounting 
Officers, who are accountable for the distribution of resources from their budgets to LAs to 
support service delivery in their policy areas. They also advise the Secretary of State on the use 
of intervention powers. In addition, various other central government departments are 
responsible for policies that are ultimately delivered by LAs: they have introduced additional 
accountability arrangements for these services and are responsible for their functioning. These 
other departments include: 
• Department for Education – Education and Children’s Services,  
• Department of Health (DoH) – Adult Social Care and Public Health,  
• Department for Transport – Transport, and 
• Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs – Waste.  
 
LAs are established in statute, responsible to their electorate for the spending decisions they 
make, and have responsibilities mainly covered by a framework of legal duties which set out 
what they must do and set checks and balances on their actions. These duties include the role 
of officers and councillors, and accountability to the public. The core accountability system is 
largely based on the application of these legal duties.  
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Funding of the service is through the DCLG’s Settlement Funding Assessment, a share of the 
business rates under the new rates retention scheme, Council Tax, and fees and charges from 
services. The majority of central funding for local government is not subject to ring-fencing. 
The two major exceptions are schools funding from the Department of Education and the new 
Public Heath grant from the DoH. However, LAs receive most of their funding from central 
government, and are severely restricted in their ability to raise Council Tax – the only major 
source of revenue raised locally. 
 
In addition, LAs are subject to strict financial controls and accountable to the public. The 
principal local checks on regularity and propriety cover clarity about who is responsible for 
resources, a set of financial duties and rules that require prudence in spending, internal checks 
that the rules are being followed, and external checks by an independent auditor. 
 
Audit arrangements are subject to the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, which 
repealed the Audit Commission Act 1998 and reformed the processes for performance and 
financial audit of local government. These reforms included abolishing the Local Government 
Standards Board regime, the Audit Commission (which closed on 31st March 2015) and 
transferring a number of its responsibilities to other organisations, including the NAO. In the 
place of the Audit Commission, there is a new framework for local public audit, due to start 
after the Commission's current contracts with audit suppliers end in 2016/17, or potentially in 
2019/20 if all the contracts are extended. A transitional body, Public Sector Audit 
Appointments Limited (PSAA), will oversee the contracts in the intervening period. The NAO 
will produce the code of practice and supporting guidelines for LAs, as well as enhance its 
existing value for money studies by conducting a small number of reports into local public 
service delivery.  
 
The Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 also provides for the Audit Commission's data 
matching powers and the National Fraud Initiative to transfer to the Cabinet Office. The Audit 
Commission's counter-fraud function will transfer to a new public sector ‘Counter Fraud 
Centre' to be established by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy 
(CIPFA).  
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Once the transitional audit arrangements come to an end, local public sector bodies will have 
the power to appoint their own auditors. However, the Local Government Association (LGA) 
successfully lobbied for a change to the Act, as a result of which local bodies can collaborate 
and continue to procure audit at a national level. This means that each audited body will not 
have to establish its own independent audit appointments panel. DCLG has consulted on the 
details of the arrangements and published draft secondary legislation that will underpin the 
objectives set out in the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014. The draft Local Audit 
Regulations were published in June 2014. 
 
The changes to the audit arrangements require LAs to adjust to dealing with a wider range of 
organisations than at present, including PSAA, NAO, the Cabinet Office and the DCLG. LAs 
will have to liaise with government departments, regulators and auditors about various issues 
previously dealt with or coordinated by the Audit Commission. It is not clear, for example, 
who will investigate complaints against auditors or their fees after the Audit Commission 
closes. 
 
The Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 does not provide for the national collation and 
reporting of the results of local audits, although PSAA will publish information on the results 
of auditors’ work with local government bodies until current contracts come to an end. After 
that, there has been no clear or specific commitment to produce reports setting out the big 
picture across local government or health services.  
 
In short, the new arrangements for local audit break up the old regulatory framework. The 
NAO, Financial Reporting Council, Recognised Supervisory Bodies, local auditor panels and 
audit firms will all have parts to play in the new landscape. This creates a number of 
uncertainties about how local appointment and oversight of auditors will work. 
 
In terms of performance management, the Coalition Government has dismantled much of the 
performance management framework for local government, replacing centrally driven 
performance reporting and data requirements in favour of sector self-regulation, transparency 
and local accountability. 
 
Following the abolition of national performance frameworks, LAs and the LGA introduced a 
‘Sector Led Improvement’ (SLI) approach to improvement. This is based on four underlying 
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principles: LAs are responsible for their own performance; LAs should be accountable locally 
not nationally; there is a sense of collective responsibility for the performance of the sector as 
a whole, and the role of the LGA is to provide tools and support. 
 
The LGA offers a range of practical support to encourage and enable LAs to exploit the 
opportunities that this approach to improvement provides. This includes support of a corporate 
nature such as leadership programmes, peer challenge, LG Inform (the LGA benchmarking 
service), as well as programmes tailored to specific sectors – such as children's, adults, health, 
care, financial, culture, tourism, sport and planning services.  
 
With regards to transparency, the Local Authority (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and 
Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012 introduced greater transparency and 
openness into meetings. As a result, citizens can only be refused entry to meetings in limited 
circumstances, and they must be able to access documents relating to meetings and executive 
decisions. 
 
In addition, DCLG’s Code of Recommended Practice on Data Transparency, also known as 
the Local Government Transparency Code 2014, lists a range of datasets that LAs must make 
available to the public. These include publication of annual accounts and each line of spending 
worth over £500. It also comprises senior employee salaries, including the officer’s name (with 
consent), job description, responsibilities, budgets and number of staff. In addition, it includes 
councillor allowances and expenses, copies of contracts and tenders, and grants to the voluntary 
and social enterprise sectors. Furthermore, it includes policies, performance and external audit, 
and covers key inspections and key indicators on fiscal and financial position. 
 
The Code does not replace or supersede the existing legal framework for access to and re-use 
of public sector information. This framework is set out in the Freedom of Information Act 2000 
(as amended by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012), Environmental Information Regulations 
2004, re-use of Public Sector Information Regulations 2005, Infrastructure for Spatial 
Information in the European Community Regulations 2009, and Section 15 of the Audit 
Commission Act 1998 that provides a right for individuals to inspect a LAs accounting records 
and supporting documentation, and to make copies of them, for a limited period each year. 
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Finally, the Localism Act 2011 requires LAs to be open in their approach to pay. Sections 38-
43 of the Act stipulate that they must publish a ‘Pay Policy Statement’ and any decision taken 
on pay must reflect the current Pay Policy.  
 
2.3 Information and its Interrogation 
 
DCLG’s LA statistics and CIPFA’s financial and performance databases allow for 
investigation and analysis of expenditure and performance information, although the latter is 
only available to subscribers.  
 
However, the collection, analysis, availability, transparency and interrogation of these data and 
other LA statistics has become increasingly difficult since 2010 (Transparency International, 
2013). This largely results from the loss of the Audit Commission’s, inspectorates and other 
regulators and improvement agencies, operational research and evaluation capacity. For 
example the Audit Commission produced numerous reports on local government, value for 
money and improvement between 1983 and 2010. This follows on from the earlier closure of 
the Improvement and Development Agency, which itself had a considerable database although 
some of the latter have been transferred to the LGA website. These databases and reports were 
however predominantly made available on interactive websites with interrogation tools and 
functionality freely available to scrutineers and researchers. When these were closed and the 
files passed to the National Archives, the latter does not maintain either the functionality nor 
the integrity nor the full coverage of the record. It provides only a sample snapshot of the 
website at a particular time and the ability to access and research the vast collection of 
individual reports on individual authorities or groups of authorities has become immeasurably 
more difficult if not virtually impossible.   
 
In addition, there has been a significant reduction in DCLG’s research and evaluation capacity, 
as well as that of external bodies. Although ministers argued initially that volunteer ‘armchair 
auditors’ would step into the gap created by the Audit Commission’s abolition and analyse the 
data published under transparency requirements, this has not proved to be the case and there is 
neither a single (nor multiple) archive(s) in the public domain where the information is brought 
together, nor any tools and techniques developed and publically available for interpreting or 
interrogating the ‘raw’ information if it was. Even if this army of volunteer researchers had 
emerged, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) (2014) highlighted that there is no evidence 
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that they would be able to draw meaningful conclusions and recommendations from the raw 
data that has become available.  
 
The loss of capacity has only been partially compensated for by the development of operational 
research capacity and capability at the NAO. Historically there has been some independent 
academic research capacity in the management of LAs. However, like public management 
academic research and teaching in general, it is under pressure and significantly declining – as 
evidenced by the Public Administration Committee of the Joint Universities Council.   
 
2.4 Governance, Leadership and Strategic Alignment   
 
To assist good governance, CIPFA and the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives 
(SOLACE) issued Delivering Good Governance in Local Government: Framework and 
Accompanying Guidance Note in 2007, which was updated in 2012 through an addendum and 
revisions.  
 
Good governance is important to all involved in local government and maintaining and 
improving governance is a key responsibility of the Leader of the Council and the Head of Paid 
Service (chief executive or their equivalent). There are also designated statutory roles and 
responsibilities for the LA’s Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and the 
Monitoring Officer. The LA is legally obliged to maintain a balanced budget and the Chief 
Financial Officer discharges this statutory function. Additionally, there are statutory 
requirements associated with the roles and responsibilities of the Director of Children’s 
Services and the Director of Adult Services. There is also a responsibility on all members of 
the leadership team, full council or authority, and those responsible for monitoring and 
providing assurance on governance arrangements for ensuring strategic alignment.  
 
With regards to strategic alignment, DCLG awarded the CIPFA/SOLACE Framework ‘proper 
practices’ status through non-statutory guidance. As a result, LAs must prepare and publish an 
annual governance statement to accompany the statement of accounts in order to meet a 
statutory requirement set out in Regulation 4(2) of the Accounts and Audit Regulations 2003, 
as amended by the Accounts and Audit (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2006. This 
regulation requires LAs to prepare a statement of internal control in accordance with the 
Framework’s ‘proper practices’ for developing and maintaining a local code of governance and 
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for discharging accountability for the proper conduct of public business. Therefore, these 
statements follow a standardised template set out in the framework, in which LAs make their 
practices and structures open and explicit, and map them against agreed best practice. This 
helps to ensure that governance practices are strategically aligned. 
 
Good governance enables a LA leadership to pursue its vision effectively, and also underpins 
that vision with control and the management of risk for strategic alignment. However, that 
strategic alignment is under pressure, because local government has been undergoing 
significant change in an increasingly complex environment. In addition to economic and 
financial sustainability challenges, the Localism Act and other legislation has brought new 
roles, opportunities and greater flexibility. Furthermore, LAs have been changing their models 
of service delivery for some time; local public services are now delivered directly, through 
partnerships, collaboration, and commissioning, and by combined authorities. The introduction 
of new structures and ways of working provide challenges for strategic alignment in managing 
risk, ensuring transparency, and demonstrating accountability.  
 
2.5 Reporting, Scrutiny and Intervention  
 
LA financial reporting to central government now focuses solely on financial information. 
These reports are based on the statutory requirement for LAs to ensure accountability and 
transparency for financial stewardship, which is set out in the Local Government Act 1972. A 
single individual, the Section 151 Officer (who is often the finance director, and must be a 
qualified accountant), is personally responsible for producing a balanced revenue budget every 
year. The Local Government Act 2003 also makes a balanced budget a requirement and the 
Section 151 officer has to report on the robustness of estimates and adequacy of reserves. These 
budgets and reports are then subject to a financial audit. Since 2010 there has been no statutory 
requirement for LAs to produce performance reports for central government, although some 
authorities still publish them for local accountability purposes. 
 
In addition, other central government departments sometimes attach specific conditions to 
funding streams, in which case they often require LAs to report back on how the money was 
spent. 
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Internal ‘overview and scrutiny’ committees were established by the Local Government Act 
2000. They were intended as a counterweight to the new executive structures created by that 
Act, which required LAs to introduce either elected mayors or a leader and cabinet system. The 
role of these committees was to develop and review policy and make recommendations to the 
council. Following the Localism Act 2011, councils with executive governance arrangements 
are required to have at least one overview and scrutiny committee that is independent of the 
executive. This Act also permitted councils to revert to the previous committee system if they 
so wished – in which case they can operate overview and scrutiny committees if they choose, 
but they are not required to do so.  
 
Scrutiny is exercised at the local level through regulations and practices. Inter-agency and 
collaborative working with other local public services is also ‘horizontally’ scrutinised to a 
degree. This is in Local Resilience Forums (although the former Regional Resilience Forums 
have been abolished), Health and Wellbeing Boards, which are still relatively immature and 
untested as scrutiny bodies, and Community Safety Partnerships. In terms of expenditure and 
budgeting, services can also use CIPFA’s interactive financial database and interrogative tools 
to benchmark with other bodies. 
 
LAs also manage processes of ‘external scrutiny’, in that their committees look at issues which 
lie outside the council’s responsibilities. For example, specific powers exist to scrutinise health 
bodies; crime and disorder partnerships; Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs); and flood 
risk management authorities. In the context of multiple collaborative arrangements and 
proposals for further devolution of powers to LAs, the Centre for Public Scrutiny has proposed 
the creation of Local Public Accounts Committees (LPACs) to scrutinise the whole range of 
public spending within a given area, although the idea is as yet undeveloped.  
 
In terms of the health sector, the People, Communities and Local Government Division of the 
DoH prepared the LA Health Scrutiny Guidance to help LAs and their partners scrutinise these 
services effectively. However, because LAs commission or provide public health services of 
their own, as well as commission or provide health services to the National Health Service 
(NHS), they are themselves within the scope of health scrutiny legislation. In other words, LAs 
may be both scrutineer and scrutinee of health services. Although this is not a new situation, it 
is nonetheless important to bear in mind possible conflicts of interest when making 
arrangements for the scrutiny of LAs’ own role in health provision. The accountability, 
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transparency and scrutiny arrangements for the new ‘Combined authorities’ and particularly 
the proposed devolution of significant health budgets to the Greater Manchester area will be 
particularly challenging.  
 
Many LAs have separate staff and financial resources for overview and scrutiny committees, 
although annual surveys conducted by the Centre for Public Scrutiny indicate that the function 
has suffered from resource constraints in recent years. Indeed, the Centre has called on LAs to 
‘up their game’ in respect of scrutiny following the recent scandal associated with children’s 
services in Rotherham. In addition, a recent report found wide variation across England in 
terms of the number of meetings held by overview and scrutiny committees, and highlighted 
concerns from council officers and councillors that they do not provide sufficient interrogation 
(Grant Thornton, 2015).  
 
Ultimately, LAs that fail to deliver for their local communities can be voted out by their 
electorate. However, there are a number of external systems in place for intervention should 
they fail to fulfil their functions in terms of the maintenance of regularity, propriety and value 
for money. In cases affecting an individual for example, the Local Government Ombudsman 
provides an independent route of complaint and redress. For service specific failure, such as in 
children’s services, the relevant government department has in some cases put in place specific 
failure and improvement regimes. In terms of the overall corporate performance of a LA, the 
LGA is co-ordinating the local government sector in providing peer support to LAs. As a last 
resort, central government still has powers to investigate and intervene.   
 
The LGA has an approach to ‘identify’ LAs that could benefit from ‘preventative improvement 
support’, but it is debateable whether this approach is actually effective and delivers against its 
objectives.  
 
The LGA approach is based on published financial and service delivery data from inspectorates 
and regulators, data and informal information from peer challenge, and informal conversations 
with the sector. Information sharing arrangements are in place between the LGA and 
government departments and the Inspectorates to ensure that the LGA has the intelligence to 
focus support. In addition, the LGA meets regularly with the DCLG and each party will share 
intelligence about performance concerns and to assess the progress of sector support. Alongside 
this, the DCLG and Local Government’s “Localities” arrangements - where all the senior civil 
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servants in the department are twinned with one or more LAs - offer senior level engagement 
with each LA area. This arrangement is separate from performance considerations and focuses 
largely on policy and implementation. However, information from the arrangement is ‘shared 
where appropriate’.   
 
Once an issue has been identified the LGA can initiate a SLI. If the issue cannot be resolved, 
or if a LA refused to engage with the SLI, the Secretary of State could commission a corporate 
governance investigation to ensure a robust evidence base. The personal authority to do this 
follows on from the Local Government Act 1999, and the Local Audit and Accountability Act 
2014 that abolished the Audit Commission. These Acts also give the Secretary of State the 
power to direct LAs to take actions, and ultimately direct another body to take over specific 
functions of a LA, if the authority is unwilling to engage with the LGA in light of the evidence 
gathered after an investigation.   
 
Following its recent experience of intervening in Doncaster, the DCLG has developed a model 
for handling future interventions, which involves working closely with the local government 
sector. A recent report commissioned by the LGA found that an initial attempt at SLI is likely 
to be more effective than central intervention, although the latter should remain an option in 
order to incentivise LAs to engage with the SLI and provide a fall-back position if the SLI 
proves insufficient (Bennett et al., 2014). A rejoinder to this report, reconsidering both the LGA 
sponsored report and lessons from previous intervention regimes, but looking at how a future 
regime could learn lessons from both and potentially be improved has also recently been 
researched (Murphy and Jones, forthcoming).   
 
2.6 Potential Value for Money ‘Risks’ 
 
The above discussion raises a number of key value for money risks for LA services. These 
concerns, along with some developments that may mitigate them to some extent, are detailed 
below: 
 
1. Central control over local government revenue (grants, business rates and Council Tax) 
means that individual LAs do not have the flexibility to respond to sudden increases in 
demand, robustly plan for the future, or in some instances, fill growing resource gaps. 
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This is only mitigated to a small extent by the introduction of three-year funding 
agreements and LAs’ limited ability to raise revenue through fees and charges or other 
sources of income. 
2. The statutory requirements of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 is more 
focussed on financial conformance in financial reporting rather than the medium and 
long term sustainable management of financial and other resources that were 
continuously improving in successive generations of the Audit Commissions’ former 
Use of Resources Assessments. These more fundamental risks to public assurance are 
not mitigated by other parts of the performance management and/or public assurance 
regimes. As such, the current regime is demonstrably poorer than previous performance 
and financial assurance arrangements and, in our view requires urgent strengthening. 
3. The abolition of centralised performance monitoring frameworks, comparable quality 
assured indicators and the Audit Commission means that there is relatively significantly 
less data available on the quality and scope of LA services, and less capacity to 
interrogate this data effectively. This is because the previous regime systematically 
captured service inspections and reports; corporate inspections and reports; annual 
audits and Use of Resources assessments; and the work of other regulators which all 
informed innovation and improvement that were disseminated through a regular series 
of national reports. It did so over time for individual public bodies and across sectors 
and services at any one time. The current regime obscures risks associated with 
operational performance and means an informed judgment of the extent to which any 
LA provides value for money is very difficult. The duty of the DCLG Accounting 
Officer to assure parliament on value for money is therefore more difficult to fulfil as 
they have less means to do so, given that the Secretary of State has effectively 
dismantled some parts of the system. Armchair auditors have not stepped into the Audit 
Commission’s breach to mitigate this risk, and the NAO is limited to undertaking high-
level assessments of value for money across the sector, rather than within individual 
LAs. However SLIs on benchmarking do mean that some data are available to compare 
performance. 
4. Most major capital investments rely on either Private Finance Initiative (PFI) / Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) or Tax Increment Financing. The former mechanism has 
significant long-term financial implications and has been widely criticised by 
academics and practitioners for being inadequate, inflexible and potentially hugely 
expensive, whereas the latter is based on projections of significant increases in business 
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rates revenue that may not materialise. Although LAs could opt for prudential 
borrowing instead, most have not done so, and initiatives such as ‘Gateway’ processes 
that aim to check the value for money of particular initiatives have not always been 
successful.  
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Section 3 Fire and Rescue Services 
 
This section on Fire and Rescue Services covers:  
• review of accountability and transparency literature,  
• accountability and transparency arrangements,  
• information and its interrogation,  
• governance, leadership and strategic alignment,  
• reporting, scrutiny and intervention, and  
• potential value for money risks. 
 
3.1 Review of Accountability and Transparency Literature 
 
Whilst there is a huge amount of academic literature within the physical sciences, the medical 
sciences and engineering relating to combustion, materials resistance to fire and combustion, 
and other common, natural and man-made hazards such as flooding; and there is a similarly 
large academic literature in the social sciences (particularly in Psychology and Sociology) 
relating to issues such as post incident trauma and fire setting and other deviant behaviour; 
there is notoriously little public management literature relating specifically to FRSs, and fewer 
still relating to accountability and transparency (Wankheda and Murphy, 2012). 
 
This is despite FRSs being a universal service internationally; delivered by central and local 
governments, by private sector providers and by third sector organisations and volunteer 
services in different parts of the world. The FRSs are therefore eminently capable of being 
investigated through public sector management theories (Liddle and Murphy, 2013, Murphy 
and Greenhalgh, 2013a). 
 
In England, FRSs are primarily locally controlled and, as with local government, power and 
control is contested in central and local government relations.  
 
There is a large overlap in arrangements for accountability and transparency and much of the 
local government literature is applicable to FRSs, and therefore will be extrapolated here to 
give some ‘potential’ insight. For example, during the 1980’s to 2010 successive central 
governments centralized accountability arrangements (in both FRSs and local government) 
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through the Audit Commission, audit, and performance management regimes including CCT, 
Best Value, CPA and CAA (Seal, 1999, 2003; Seal and Ball, 2005, 2006, 2011), all of which 
were applied to FRSs.  
 
Since 2010 the Coalition Government has pursued a policy of ‘austerity localism’ (Lowndes 
and Pratchett, 2012), and undertaken governing and budgeting for deficit reduction through 
changes to the spending review, budget, and audit and accountability arrangements (Ferry and 
Eckersley, 2015a, Murphy, 2014). Reforms such as the Localism Act 2011 have given LAs 
greater autonomy over spending decisions but not local revenue generation (Ferry, Eckersley 
and van Dooren, 2015), which has had implications for FRSs. 
 
The Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 applies to FRSs and confirmed that future LA 
audits would be overseen centrally by the NAO and focus solely on financial management, but 
have no performance assessment (Ellwood, 2014). As with local government, this makes 
‘financial conformance’ rather than ‘operational performance’ the overriding focus, and 
ostensibly weakens local accountability because it obscures the potential impact of austerity 
cuts (Ferry and Eckersley, 2015a). The lack of performance information means the NAO 
(2014) value for money report on ‘financial sustainability’ becomes reduced to highlighting 
risks that certain Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRAs) may not be able to set a balanced budget 
or fulfil statutory duties, potentially leading to central government intervention.  
 
The NAO have raised public accountability concerns as DCLG do not have the arrangements 
in place to monitor how well authorities utilize their allocations. As with LAs the new 
accountability and audit arrangements let us know if the DCLG and FRAs are spending within 
budget, but not what value for money the public are getting.  
 
As with local government, ‘armchair auditors’ have not materialised under the transparency 
agenda to fill the accountability void created by Audit Commission closure and performance 
audit abandonment. The result for FRAs is likely to be similar to local government, where it is 
now difficult to comprehensively assess the quality of service outputs and outcomes 
(Eckersley, Ferry and Zakaria, 2014), and given austerity holding down input costs and 
budgetary stewardship will be the over-riding concern (Ferry, Coombs and Eckersley, in press). 
Transparency is therefore unlikely to prove a substitute for accountability that can be afforded 
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by independent professional auditors assessing performance (Ferry, Eckersley and Zakaria, 
2015).  
 
3.2 Accountability and Transparency Arrangements 
 
The Secretary of State for Local Government and Communities is accountable to Parliament 
for services of fire and rescue in England, and is supported in this stewardship role by the 
DCLG. The Accounting Officer for DCLG is accountable to Parliament for the stewardship of 
resources allocated to FRAs.  
 
The roles and responsibilities of FRS and FRA were clarified in the third Fire and Rescue 
National Framework for England (DCLG 2012) published in July 2012. The FRA oversees the 
policy and service delivery of a FRS. The Chief Fire Officer (CFO) is responsible for the day 
to day command of the FRS and is accountable to the FRA. There are processes for the 
Accounting Officer at DCLG to provide assurance to Parliament that grants made by the DCLG 
are properly accounted for by FRAs, ensure regularity, propriety and value for money, and to 
advise the Secretary of State on the use of intervention powers. 
 
FRAs are locally accountable bodies made up of elected councillors from the LAs within their 
areas. There are varying types of FRAs. These include Metropolitan Authorities made up of a 
number of Metropolitan Councils and whose councillors represent the Authority, County 
Authorities where the FRS is one of a number of services provided by the Council, and 
Combined Authorities serving combined county council and unitary authority areas and whose 
councillors represent the Authority. In addition, there is a London Fire and Emergency 
Planning Authority (a functional body of the Greater London Authority) whose membership 
consists of nominees from the London Boroughs, London Assembly and Mayoral appointees. 
 
Funding for services of fire and rescue is similar to that for LAs i.e. through the Local 
Government Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) budget for core funding and DCLG DEL 
budget to implement departmental priorities, a local share of business rates under the new rates 
retention scheme, a levy on Council Tax, and fees and charges from services such as training.  
 
The same set of strict financial controls that are applied to LAs also applies to FRAs for 
accountability. This includes regularity and propriety as to who is responsible for resources, 
28 
 
financial duties and rules for prudence in spending, internal checks that rules are followed, and 
external checks by an independent auditor. The legislative framework is slightly different for 
FRAs mainly because of their role as part of the national resilience arrangements as well as the 
local services. 
 
FRAs are subject to the new auditing and accounting regime introduced by the Local Audit and 
Accountability Act 2014, which repealed the Audit Commission Act 1998. This gives local 
bodies freedom to appoint their own auditors and manage their own audit arrangements. A new 
audit framework reflects the regulatory roles found in the companies sector. The NAO has 
produced the code of practice and supporting guidelines and enhanced existing programmes of 
value for money examinations to carry out a small number of studies to take in local delivery, 
although it is not clear if any of these will be in FRAs. 
 
Since 2010, the FRS performance management regime, including arrangements for assessing 
value for money, have in practice been focused around the LGA SLI approach. The latest Peer 
Challenge and Operational Assessments were developed by the LGA, in partnership with the 
Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA), and are complemented by an industry standard Fire 
and Rescue Operational Assessment Toolkit, originally produced by the LGA, CFOA, DCLG 
and the governments’ Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor (CFRA).  
 
The former independent Her Majesty’s Fire Service Inspectorate was incorporated into the 
Audit Commission and effectively disappeared with the Audit Commission’s abolition 
(although the title is technically available if a future government wished to re-instate the role). 
England and Wales are very unusual as countries in being without independent fire 
inspectorates (in Scotland and Northern Ireland the role was retained) and there have been 
industry-wide calls and campaigns through for example the Fire Sector Federation, CFOA and 
FIRE magazine for its restitution (Murphy and Greenhalgh, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014; Lynch, 
2013).  
 
The Local Authority (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) 
(England) Regulations 2012 that introduced greater transparency and openness into council 
meetings also apply to FRAs. As such, members of the public can only be refused admission 
in limited circumstances and they must be able to access documents that relate to meetings and 
executive decisions. 
29 
 
 
DCLG’s Code of Recommended Practice on Data Transparency, also known as the Local 
Government Transparency Code 2014 applies to the FRS as well as LAs. As such, it lists a 
range of datasets that FRSs must make available to the public. These include publication of 
annual accounts and each line of spending worth over £500. It also comprises senior employee 
salaries, including the officer’s name (with consent), job description, responsibilities, budgets 
and number of staff. In addition, it includes councillor allowances and expenses, copies of 
contracts and tenders, and grants to the voluntary and social enterprise sectors. Furthermore, it 
includes policies, performance and external audit, and covers key inspections and key 
indicators on fiscal and financial position. 
 
The Localism Act 2011 requires all LAs (and therefore includes FRAs) to be open in their 
approach to pay. Sections 38-43 of the Act requires publication of a ‘Pay Policy Statement’ 
and any decision taken on pay must reflect the current Pay Policy. 
 
3.3 Information and its Interrogation 
 
DCLG’s Fire statistics, together with financial and performance databases from CFOA and 
CIPFA, allow for investigation and analysis of expenditure and other performance information, 
although the latter two are only available to subscribers. As with LAs however, the collection, 
analysis, availability, transparency, and interrogation of these fire data has become increasingly 
difficult since 2010. This is due, in part, to the demise of the Audit Commission, which used 
to collect and publish national performance statistics. A proposal to outsource the collection 
and reporting of some government Fire Service Statistics by DCLG in 2013 has not yet been 
implemented.  A Fire and Rescue Statistics user group and the Fire Services college is available 
to advise DCLG and a steering/advisory/development group comprising Directors of Finance 
for Fire Services advises CFOA and CIPFA on content.  
 
As with local government, there has been a significant reduction in capacity to research, 
evaluate and interrogate these data, from both within DCLG and external bodies. This largely 
results from the loss of operational research and evaluation capacity from the Audit 
Commission – an organisation that produced 28 national reports relating specifically to fire and 
rescue management between 1983 and 2010, and numerous others with indirect relevance. This 
loss of capacity has only been partially compensated for by the development of operational 
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research capacity and capability at the NAO. Historically there has been very little independent 
academic research capacity in the management of fire and rescue. This, like public management 
academic research and teaching in general, is significantly declining as is evidenced by the 
Public Administration Committee of the Joint Universities Council.   
 
Following the demise of centralised performance reporting, a Fire Peer Challenge and 
Operational Assessment devised by the LGA in consultation with CFOA, is the principal tool 
or group of techniques for assessing and assisting performance in FRSs (LGA/CFOA, 2013). 
The Fire Peer Challenge is based on the Corporate Peer Challenge for LAs and has some design 
and content similarities with the Self-Assessment and Peer Review elements of earlier local 
government performance management frameworks such as CAA, as well as individual service 
inspection regimes. The Operational Assessment was originally designed to complement the 
CAA process, which had a separate ‘Use of Resources’ assessment that included value for 
money. Fire Peer Challenge has had a greater take up in the fire sector than corporate peer 
challenges in LAs. However, the Peer Challenge and Operational Assessment are partial, 
voluntary and discretionary and focus more on effectiveness rather than broader value for 
money concerns. Although the more recent Knight Report for DCLG (Knight, 2013) reviewed 
potential efficiencies in fire and rescue operations, it is debateable whether has had much 
impact on value for money in practice.   
 
Unlike the LA Corporate Peer Challenge process, the Fire Peer Challenge and Operational 
Assessment has now been commissioned by ‘all’ 46 FRSs in England and Wales, and the 
reports of those completed were initially published (unlike the LA reports) on the LGA website 
although they have recently been withdrawn.  
   
3.4 Governance, Leadership and Strategic Alignment 
 
The years immediately before and after the turn of the 21st century were characterised in FRSs 
by poor governance, fragmented leadership and a lack of strategic alignment at local and 
national levels (Bain et al, 2002). These problems were exacerbated by the national firefighters’ 
strike, which was only the second national dispute since the establishment of the services after 
the Second World War – but a dispute that lasted over five years from 1998 to 2003.    
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Between 2003 and 2010 central and local government, local FRSs, CFOA, and the Audit 
Commission sought to re-establish collective sector leadership and facilitate performance 
improvement, innovation and service delivery. For example, the Fire and Rescue Act 2004 and 
the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 were the start of a period of gradual acceptance and 
engagement, characterised by increasing strategic alignment through joined up policy and 
delivery, improved performance management and investment in infrastructure and system 
support. Although the development of tools, techniques, systems and interventions were always 
some way behind developments in the equivalent health and local government regimes, they 
were rapidly progressing and generally considered to be ahead of services worldwide. For 
example, the Integrated Risk Management Planning (IRMP) process received international 
recognition with Scotland (Scottish FRS, 2013), Ireland (National Directorate for Fire and 
Emergency Services, 2012), Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and others, gradually 
adopting similar approaches or parts of the regime.    
 
Since 2010 this collective leadership has fragmented with significant loss of capacity and 
coherence accompanied by a loss of collective vision thereby challenging strategic alignment, 
as the coalition government has reduced its role, as demonstrated in the latest National 
Framework (DCLG, 2012). As in previous periods of the FRS’s history, leadership and 
collective responsibility has largely been left to CFOA and there is a clear risk to individual 
and collective aspirations for efficiency and value for money. Although the LGA has offered a 
Financial Health Check (LGA, 2013) under their SLI programme since 2013, there is no 
evidence that this has been embraced or had an impact in FRSs. Overall therefore, the service 
for fire and rescue has been driven by the theory and practice of short term cutback management 
since the recession, rather than the previous theory and practice of public service performance 
management and governance. 
 
3.5 Reporting, Scrutiny and Intervention 
 
The CFOA provides strategic advice and guidance to ministers, civil servants, and FRAs on 
the structure, organisation and performance of FRAs and FRSs, although he has no reporting 
obligations to parliament or to the public other than through the DCLG. Individual FRSs have 
no reporting responsibilities, other than statistical returns to Parliament, DCLG, the Secretary 
of State or other regulators or agencies. Their financial reporting responsibilities are enshrined 
in the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014.  
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The Open Government White Paper (Cabinet Office 2011) and the third National Framework 
(DCLG 2012) clearly differentiated the responsibilities of FRAs and FRSs along the 
‘commissioner provider’ split, and scrutiny is largely exercised at the local level through local 
government structures, regulations and practices. However, there is no demonstrable evidence 
that this has made any significant impact in practice, and no discernible impact on either the 
amount or quality of scrutiny by FRAs. The relevant inter-agency and collaborative working 
arrangements are ‘horizontally’ scrutinised in Local Resilience Forums that emerged out of 
long standing local emergency planning groups, Health and Wellbeing Boards that are of 
relatively recent origin and therefore untested in their ‘scrutiny’ role, and Community Safety 
Partnerships. In terms of expenditure and budgeting, all FRSs are able to benchmark through 
CIPFA’s interactive financial database and its interrogative tools. In terms of external scrutiny 
however, the FRAs and FRSs have considerable discretion to determine what is reported to the 
public, when and in what detail. As a result, their reports and the data behind them are very 
variable not particularly useful for the purposes of conducting meaningful comparisons across 
organisations and scrutinising their activities as Murphy and Greenhalgh (2012) found in a 
previous survey for Nottinghamshire FRS. To try and overcome such concerns, full disclosure 
of the IRMP process in each authority and regular updating of their reviews could be made 
available on websites and potentially on a single collective point for all authorities.  
 
FRAs/FRSs are subject to the duty of Best Value, and the Secretary of State for DCLG has 
broad intervention powers conferred by the Local Government Act 1999 and the Fire and 
Rescue Services Act 2004. For example, Section 28 of the latter Act provides powers to obtain 
information or to take action in any circumstances where central government may wish to have 
an investigation or assessment. This could include a major fire incident investigation or where 
there are serious concerns regarding the discharging of their functions or even corporate failure. 
Sections 22 and 23 allow the Secretary of State to intervene if he or she feels there is a risk that 
a FRA/FRS will fail, provided they consult and demonstrate why this risk is imminent or 
serious. He or she is required to have regard to the updated Protocol on Central Government 
Engagement in Poorly Performing Local Authorities 2014, although this has not been used to 
date.   
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As with LAs in general, the central government’s expectation is that sector partners will 
provide initial support. In other words, ministers would only intervene in the most serious of 
failures, or if sector-support is refused or incapable of turning around the under-performance.  
 
3.6 Potential Value for Money ‘Risks’ 
 
The current financial and performance management regime for FRAs/FRSs is weak and can 
only support value for money to a limited extent. There is no independent inspectorate 
capability to provide external assurance, and it is debateable whether the Knight report has had 
any effect in increasing productivity. At the least this could be measured through metrics of 
outputs per full time equivalent and cost per output for financial benefits and then capture non-
financial costs and benefits and adjust accordingly. Despite financial restrictions, the capture 
of efficiency savings has largely been left to individual FRAs/FRSs. The evidence base is 
fracturing and there are clear risks to its future adequacy in terms of both quality and quantity. 
As the above discussion has highlighted, there is also a noticeable reduction in leadership, 
infrastructural support and innovation, with only the CFOA being consistently engaged and 
pro-active.  
 
In addition, the Peer Challenge and Operational Assessment processes have clear inadequacies 
in terms of external assurance and reporting. This is because Peer Challenges inter alia allows 
those being challenged to decide what range of issues are to be considered and to influence 
‘who’ provides the challenge, and is therefore open to gaming. There is no obligation to publish 
the report at all, let alone in a timely fashion, and there is no automatic follow up to the final 
reports or any implementation. The designers and commissioners of these processes (the LGA 
and CFOA) – recognise some – but not all – of these shortcomings.  
 
Similarly, there is little capacity to produce either thematic or more comprehensive approaches 
to service, organisational or financial assessment, and therefore little prospect of more quality-
assured graded judgments. Although intervention powers are extant and rest with the Secretary 
of State, the model for service and corporate interventions have not been used since the days 
of the previous CPA/CAA regime. Moreover, the most recent protocol on intervention does 
not strengthen external assurance.  
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With these concerns in mind, the key value for money risks for FRSs, along with some 
developments that may mitigate them to some extent, are detailed below: 
  
1. There is a considerable over-reliance on the Fire Peer Challenge and Operational 
Assessments, which are far from comprehensive, insufficiently robust, do not 
systematically investigate organisational and financial resilience, and is potentially 
subject to ‘gaming’. Its central objective is to encourage improvement not to provide 
public assurance, and there is no obligation for the timely publication of findings. 
Improved Peer Challenge and Operational Assessment methodologies are likely to be 
commissioned by CFOA and the LGA following the completion of the current 
generation of assessments, but they will require a complementary value for money or 
efficiency methodology at least as sophisticated as the third generation of the ‘Use of 
Resources’ regime in order to be effective. The LGA’s existing financial health check 
and the external audit arrangements are inadequate – either on their own or together.  
2. The Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 encourages short termism in financial 
reporting and could result in FRAs neglecting the short, medium and long term 
sustainable management of financial and other resources. This is because it neglects the 
short, medium and long term sustainable management of financial and other resources 
that were continuously improving in successive generations of the Audit Commissions’ 
former Use of Resources Assessments which were applied to FRS as well as LAs. These 
more fundamental risks to public assurance are not mitigated by other parts of the 
performance management and/or public assurance regimes. As such, the current regime 
is demonstrably poorer than previous performance and financial assurance 
arrangements and, in our view requires urgent strengthening. 
3. FRSs continue to depend on PFI/PPP funding for any major capital investment 
schemes. Initiatives such as ‘Gateway’ processes to check the value for money of 
particular projects during procurement do not mitigate these risks entirely. Indeed, the 
inadequacies and inefficiencies of the PFI/PPP process for capital funding have 
received little attention lately, perhaps because of the recession and consequent public 
expenditure restrictions.  
4. There is an apparent lack of will, wherewithal and drivers to capture potential inter-
agency value for money gains from ‘community of interest’ collaborations. Previous 
Total Place and community budget pilots started to investigate these issues in other 
parts of local government but no initiative s have been pursued in FRSs with Sir Ken 
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Knight reporting a ‘lack of local appetite and incentive to combine’ (Knight, 2013, p. 
8)  It is unclear whether this risk is being addressed at all. 
5. The performance management regime continues to fragment, and this is exacerbated by 
the available evidence base being of diminishing quality as well as the loss of systemic 
improvement infrastructure available to the sector.  
 
Overall, FRS deal with short and long term emergencies with other blue light services on a day 
to day basis. The FRA role is to finance and equip the response to incidents and emergencies 
and to let them get on with collaborations on the ground. It is the local resilience forums that 
make inter-agency operational response efficient and effective. The emergency services 
generally, including FRSs, have very mature efficient and effective cross-organisational 
emergency planning, resilience and interoperability capability at an operational ‘response’ 
level developed and improved continually since the pattern of emergency services were 
established from the second world war. However, it is questionable whether this has been fully 
reflected in non-response operational services, business support and systemic infrastructural 
improvements.     
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Section 4 Police Services 
 
This section on the Police Services covers:  
• review of accountability and transparency literature,  
• accountability and transparency arrangements,  
• information and its interrogation,  
• governance, leadership and strategic alignment,  
• reporting, scrutiny and intervention, and  
• potential value for money risks. 
 
4.1 Review of Accountability and Transparency Literature 
 
Research has examined reforms to the governance of local policing in England and Wales from 
managerialisation of policing in the early 1990s through to the more recent introduction of 
PCCs. For example, Gilling (2014) through a longitudinal perspective identified politically 
driven shifts in organisational regimes, initially from bureau-professionalism to 
managerialism, and more recently from managerialism to a hybridised model of local 
governance that combines elements of consumerism, democratic localism and bureau-
professionalism. He also found that these regimes are not determining structures, but are open 
to contestation and negotiation. Loveday (2005) highlighted the challenge of police reform in 
England and Wales concerning policing responsibilities and police budgets being devolved to 
Basic Command Units, which addressed a number of issues identified within the 1993 Sheehy 
Report (particularly in relation to local pay bargaining) and further efficiency reforms that 
impact on the role and status of the police and the structure of police forces. Jackson and 
Dewing (2009) examined corporate governance arrangements of police authorities in England 
and Wales and found that given the fundamental responsibility of police authorities for 
ensuring efficient and effective policing in their areas, the main challenge for police authorities 
is enhancing cohesion. 
 
In terms of PCCs, Raine and Keasey (2012) reflected on the opportunities and challenges of 
introducing them, and particularly the prospects for enhanced public accountability of policing. 
They suggest that while the plans for directly elected PCCs have proved controversial, the 
overall view is that the new approach to police governance deserves its chance because it seems 
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to offer at least some potential for stronger public accountability. However, they stress that 
much depends on the three key accountability relationships which lie at the heart of the new 
arrangements and upon which success, to a large extent, will depend. These are the relationship 
between the local public and the PCCs that are around public confidence for policy priorities, 
resourcing and impact. Secondly, the relationship between the PCC and the Chief Constable, 
which has issues of principal and agent. Finally, the relationship between the PCC and the 
Police and Crime Panel (PCP). In all three of these accountability relationships Raine and 
Keasey (2012) consider that the critical issue concerns the balance that is to be struck on the 
one hand between managerial and performance accountability, and on the other public and 
policy accountability. However, Lister (2013) suggests these changes represent arguably the 
most significant constitutional change in police governance over past half century, and that the 
new ‘quadripartite’ governance framework for police institutional accountability could 
pressure PCCs to interfere with work of Chief Constables. Concerns are therefore expressed 
with regards to scope of Chief Constables’ operational discretion and political involvement. 
 
Austerity has accelerated the drive for efficiencies across all areas of public spending in the 
UK and the need for improvements in police service performance and performance 
management that underpin accountability. Exploratory research has identified ‘potential’ areas 
of policing activity that could beneﬁt from implementation of new techniques. This includes 
“lean” principles of management as a means of focusing on more cost effective ways of 
utilising future police resources (Barton, 2013; Barton and Barton, 2011), innovative modelling 
to target police performance improvement within a speciﬁc area of measured operational 
policing  (Barton and Beynon, 2011), and the potential of multi-agency working as a 
partnership approach to reduce criminality that could help create a positive impact on police 
time and image, improve delivery of other public services and provide a better quality of life 
for citizens (Barton and Valero-Silva, 2013).  
 
However, past research has highlighted challenges with implementation of new techniques and 
how they can affect accountability. For example, Collier (2006) explored implementation of 
‘activity-based’ costing in policing in England and Wales and concluded that it was employed 
as rhetoric rather than reality for as much a political as a managerial process. This politicization 
of policing involved a shift from moral panic about crime to ﬁnancial panic over the police cost 
and performance that made certain activities visible and others such as the redistribution of 
police services relatively invisible.   
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4.2 Accountability and Transparency Arrangements 
 
The Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament for the police service in England, and is 
supported in this stewardship role by the Home Office. The Home Office Accounting Officer 
is accountable to Parliament for the stewardship of resources allocated to police bodies. There 
are processes for the Accounting Officer at the Home Office to provide assurance to Parliament 
that grants made by the Home Office are properly accounted for by local police bodies, 
ensuring regularity, propriety and value for money and to advise the Secretary of State on the 
use of intervention powers. 
 
Directly elected PCCs, which replaced Police Authorities in 2013, are accountable to residents 
outside London for ensuring local policing needs are met. For the two London police force 
areas this role is fulfilled by the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime and the Common 
Council of the City of London. Chief Constables are responsible for operational delivery of the 
local police force and directly control police officers and civilian staff and are accountable to 
PCCs. 
 
Funding for local policing bodies was received from the Home Office and raised through the 
precept component of Council Tax (this analysis is restricted to the police constabularies and 
excludes specialist forces such as the Transport Police, the Ports and harbours or specialist 
police forces such as the military police). 
 
PCCs and Police Forces are subject to the new audit and accounting regime introduced by the 
Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 which also repealed the Audit Commission 1998 
Act. In terms of audit, the NAO has the right of access to both the Home Office and PCCs. 
There is no right of access by the NAO to Police Forces, although they can consider how the 
PCCs and forces interact. Following the abolition of the Audit Commission, the NAO, 
Financial Reporting Council and professional bodies now oversee the new external audit 
framework. Under the Police Act 1996, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) 
inspects the police forces’ efficiency and effectiveness. The Home Office increased HMIC’s 
budget in 2014/15 to fund a new programme of force inspections that will provide annual 
performance assessments of each force.      
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Regulation and inspection is carried out by HMIC and the NAO, both of which are accountable 
to Parliament. Recently, the police performance management regime, including arrangements 
for assessing value for money, has in practice been led and focused around HMIC – with the 
Home Office and the other external auditors, inspectors and regulators playing a more reduced 
or less prominent role than at any time since the 1980s.  
 
HMIC’s statutory responsibilities and remit are therefore enshrined in the 1996 Police Act (as 
amended by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011), and include provision for 
an inspection framework, the inspection of both constabulary and non-constabulary police 
forces, and the collaboration of inspections across the criminal justice community of interest 
(prisons, probation, crown prosecution, and courts). HMIC inspects forces’ efficiency and 
effectiveness and publishes information on crime, finance, workforce and victim satisfaction, 
in order to enable comparisons between forces and produce annual assessments of performance 
in each force.  
 
Through transparency arrangements, the public can assess the performance of the local force 
and hold their PCC to account. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 requires 
an elected local policing body to publish any information specified by order of the Secretary 
of State. A list of these datasets was set out in the Elected Local Policing Bodies (Specified 
Information) Order 2011, and it includes total budget, expenditure on each item exceeding 
£500, revenue sources, grants made for crime and disorder reduction, salaries of senior 
employees, copies of contracts exceeding £10,000, and details of severance payments. For 
police forces, the Annual Data Requirement sets out requests for information and requires them 
to publish the financial data that HMIC uses in the preparation of its annual value for money 
profiles of police forces. The HMIC reports annually to Parliament on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the police. The public also has access to a Home Office run website that 
contains information relating to crime and policing costs in their area, and compares this to 
other areas of a similar nature.  
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4.3 Information and its Interrogation   
 
There are various sources of expenditure and other performance information relating to the 
police service, including the Home Office, HMIC and CIPFA financial and performance 
databases, although the latter are restricted to paying subscribers. Prior to its demise, the Audit 
Commission also collected and published police national performance statistics (for 
constabularies).  
 
As with other local services however, the interrogation of this information has become more 
difficult since 2010. This is due to a reduction in research and evaluation capacity, both from 
within the Home Office and external bodies. In particular, the loss of the Audit Commission, 
which produced 41 national reports relating directly to police management and value for money 
between 1983 and 2010, has only been partially compensated for by the development of 
operational research capacity and capability in HMIC and the NAO. In addition, the 
Government has replaced the National Policing Improvement Agency with a Policing College, 
which has also resulted in a long term reduction in capability and capacity. There is some 
independent academic research interest and capacity in policing and the management of 
policing, but this is relatively small.  
 
However, HMIC has conducted value for money studies of individual forces, and both the 
NAO and HMIC have discretion to undertake thematic reviews of value for money – thus re-
establishing the potential for systemic improvement, innovation and greater value for money. 
In addition, the developing Police Effectiveness Efficiency Legitimacy (PEEL) programme 
aims to provide a regular comprehensive assessment of organisational performance and the 
‘Efficiency’ element includes a ‘question’ (equivalent to the Key Lines of Enquiry (KLoE) 
under CPA/CAA) relating to short and long term financial resilience. As such, there is an 
emerging landscape of more standardised value for money assessments within the police 
service, albeit on a smaller scale than was the case before 2010. 
 
4.4 Governance, Leadership and Strategic Alignment  
 
In terms of governance, the previous formal tri-partite arrangements to integrate policy and 
delivery of policing between the Home Office, the Association of Police Authorities (APA) 
and Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) have been superseded by more disparate 
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arrangements. This is partly a result of the establishment of PCCs (and Police Panels), as well 
as changing political and policy priorities within the Home Office. In addition however, the 
arrangements for co-ordinating individual and collaborative organisational objectives, systems 
and performance management arrangements across criminal justice delivery organisations and 
networks are under-developed. This is the case for both emergency service and resilience 
networks as well as across related local service delivery agencies. 
 
Nonetheless, with regards to leadership and co-ordination of performance management, HMIC 
has embraced the leadership and co-ordinating role required for strategic alignment and 
direction. Since 2011 the inspectorate has been prominent in developing a sector-led regime, 
based largely on the frameworks for organisational and cross agency assessments that the Audit 
Commission developed for CPA and CAA respectively. HMIC is committed to an evidence-
led, integrated and inclusive developmental approach, which bears a strong resemblance to the 
approach adopted by the former Audit Commission in the early 2000s and contrasts with recent 
developments in other local public bodies. As such, the early response to the recession, which 
was based on the short term theory and practice of cutback management, is starting to be 
replaced by a return to more appropriate short and long term concerns for improving public 
service performance, management, assurance and governance. Notably however, this is largely 
driven by HMIC rather than explicitly by the government.    
 
4.5 Reporting, Scrutiny and Intervention 
 
HMIC has reporting responsibilities to parliament and to the Home Secretary, and to those 
Secretaries of State responsible for other services over which it has responsibilities (such as 
defence, revenue and customs, and transport), as well as to the organisations it inspects and 
their governing bodies. 
 
HMIC has considerable discretion as to what it reports to the public, but under the current 
governance and management regime it is adopting a relatively open and transparent approach 
based upon its publicly accessible website. This currently includes publication of all value for 
money reports that are based on a peer group, benchmarked, scorecard approach, although it 
does not yet have the interactive and/or interrogative tools that are a feature of CIPFA’s service 
expenditure and budgeting database.  
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Scrutiny is largely exercised at the local level through regulations and practices mostly 
inherited from local government but adapted to PCCs. PCPs provide a statutory oversight and 
scrutiny function in respect of PCCs. Their role involves monitoring performance of the PCC. 
Inter-agency and collaborative working with other local public services is ‘horizontally’ 
scrutinised in Local Resilience Forums, Health and Wellbeing Boards and Community Safety 
Partnerships (although in practice the police tend to dominate the latter). 
 
In terms of intervention, the Police Act 1996 Sections 40 and 40b give the Secretary of State 
statutory power to intervene in a range of circumstances including, among others for example, 
to direct Policing Bodies to take action where a Local Police Board or Police Force is failing 
or will fail to discharge its functions effectively, to direct HMIC to look into and report on any 
issue, and to ensure that force budgets are sufficient and therefore do not threaten the capability 
of the Chief Constable to provide basic policing.  
 
As this list suggests, the Home Secretary has considerable powers to intervene in the police 
service. In addition, it is worth noting that this power rests with the Secretary of State alone – 
the HMIC reports are not automatic triggers to intervention – and the Secretary of State’s 
intervention decisions are not exclusively to be based on PEEL reports, because they can order 
interventions as a result of other reports or concerns. However, most interventions follow the 
locally delivered services ‘intervention’ model that previous governments developed for LAs, 
local collaborative partnerships (such as crime and disorder reduction partnerships), and the 
health sector. In other words, the Home Secretary would rely on peer-led teams that are 
managed and sourced externally.  
 
4.6 Potential Value for Money ‘Risks’ 
 
Since its inception in the 1990s, the policing performance management regime, together with 
the police service’s appraisal of value for money and its capture of efficiency savings, has not 
been very coherent, cohesive or effective. This is in spite of a major investment in quality 
assurance systems and processes, and the fact that performance management systems have 
collected a large quantity of data.  
 
However, HMIC’s ongoing development of the annual PEEL assessment represents a move 
away from the previous thematic approach to assessment, and towards a more comprehensive 
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organisational assessment that should allow graded judgments to be made that are more quality-
assured than previous regimes. The first round of PEEL assessment were published in 
November 2014 (on a relatively wide but not fully comprehensive methodology). Amongst 
other things, these judgements will inform potential intervention activity – although as 
mentioned above, any decision to intervene rests solely with the Home Secretary. 
 
The key value for money risks for the police service, along with some developments that may 
mitigate them to some extent, are detailed below: 
 
1. The new system of PEEL assessments and its associated methodology are still 
immature and not yet as sophisticated as the third generation ‘Use of Resources’ regime 
under CPA and CAA. However, HMIC is committed to improving the PEEL 
methodology, which may mitigate this risk.  
2. The emphasis on financial reporting contained within the statutory requirements of the 
Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 neglects the short, medium and long term 
sustainable management of financial and other resources. The potential risks from 
short-termism are partially mitigated by the developing ‘efficiency’ assessment within 
the new PEEL methodology, which potentially assesses short and long term financial 
resilience and risks.  
3. A continuing dependence on PFI/PPP funding for any major capital investment 
schemes may be storing up risks for the future. Initiatives such as ‘Gateway’ processes 
to check the value for money of particular projects during procurement do not mitigate 
these risks entirely. Indeed, the inadequacies and inefficiencies of the PFI/PPP process 
for capital funding have received little attention lately, perhaps because of the recession 
and consequent public expenditure restrictions.  
4. A potential lack of will, wherewithal and drivers to capture potential inter-agency value 
for money gains from community of interest collaborations, such as Health and 
Wellbeing Boards or Community Safety partnerships. It is unclear whether this risk is 
being addressed at all. 
5. The underdevelopment of the current evidence base and the systemic improvement 
infrastructure available to the sector. However, the organisational and performance 
management regime is currently developing more rapidly and relatively better than has 
traditionally been the case in policing or in the criminal justice regime generally. 
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6. The relatively new concept of PCCs and their relationships with Chief Constables has 
led to the loss of a vast amount of knowledge and experience from Police Authorities, 
and PCCs will take some time to recover these resources. Furthermore, the new system 
is more likely to be disruptive and unstable, as existing PCCs may not be re-elected or 
be unable to complete their term of office, and incoming PCCs may have differing 
views on the local policing needs of their areas. PCCs are directly accountable to the 
public, but levels of turnout at elections suggest that citizens have not yet embraced the 
role. If relations between the PCC and Chief Constable break down, this could have 
adverse effects on the service.  
 
The emergency services generally, including the police, have very mature, efficient and 
effective cross-organisational emergency planning, resilience and interoperability capability at 
an operational level. However, this has not been fully reflected in non-response services, 
business support, or systemic infrastructural improvements. As such, although value for money 
risks have not increased by as much in the police service as they have in other sectors, some 
concerns remain. 
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Section 5 Health Service 
 
This section on the Health Service covers:  
• review of accountability and transparency literature,  
• accountability and transparency arrangements,  
• information and its interrogation,  
• governance, leadership and strategic alignment,  
• reporting, scrutiny and intervention, and  
• potential value for money risks. 
 
5.1 Review of Accountability and Transparency Literature 
 
The financial sustainability of healthcare is a significant political issue that successive 
governments have grappled with, which has rhetorically during the history of the NHS become 
framed as an ‘insoluble cost’ rather than a means to provide a healthy workforce and society 
(Gebreiter, 2015a, 2015b). 
 
During the 1980’s and in the context of cost management, the Conservative government began 
fundamental New Public Management based reforms through introduction of management 
budgeting. This was followed in the 1990’s by market-driven incentives that aimed to create a 
system of performance management to improve NHS productivity and reduce admission and 
treatment waiting times (Propper et al., 2008).  
 
When New Labour came to power in 1997, against expectations they extended neo-liberalism 
and an era of performance management through a targets driven policy and performance 
management system (Bevan and Hood, 2006). This included a star rating system introduced in 
2001 that was replaced by an annual health check from 2006 and NHS Performance Framework 
from 2008 (Ferry and Scarparo, in press). These multi-dimensional performance management 
systems were designed for delivering specific national targets and standards for local NHS 
organisations. This resulted in an intense and tight level of scrutiny of health care managers. 
Poor performing managers of NHS Trusts risked being fired and the Trusts were publicly 
‘named and shamed’ (Bevan and Hood, 2006) placing information about the NHS Trusts’ 
performance against targets in the public domain in an attempt to force Trusts’ managers to 
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comply in order to maintain social legitimacy (Llewellyn and Northcott, 2005). Unfortunately 
this had some unintended consequences. For example there was gaming (Bevan and Hood, 
2006; Propper et al., 2008), questioning of whether the system was for legitimation driven by 
political demands or actually did improve efficiency and patient care (Chang, 2006, 2009; 
Guven-Uslu and Conrad, 2008, 2011; Conrad and Guven-Uslu, 2011, 2012), and criticisms 
that the performance assessment frameworks focus on overall performance which can be 
opaque and did not get beneath to the operational realities (Bevan and Hood, 2006). 
Accordingly a hospital could appear to be very good through the performance assessment 
framework but still have serious problems of care, which was later evidenced from reports into 
accountability and transparency in the NHS following the Mid Staffs scandal (House of 
Commons, 2014; Francis 2013, 2015). It was therefore important that hospitals and especially 
the board had a rounded picture and were prepared to contest and negotiate change as part of 
their rhetorical strategies (Mueller, Harvey and Howorth, 2003; Mueller, Sillince, Harvey and 
Howorth, 2004).  
 
Since 2010 the Coalition government retained audit and performance management systems 
alongside transparency arrangements for healthcare services, but changed the institutions and 
structures for how accountability practices would be delivered. For example, Ellwood and 
Garcia-Lacalle (2012) highlighted the changing landscape of local public audit following 
abolition of the Audit Commission and its audit practice (District Audit) with regards to the 
NHS. In particular they emphasized that it was still to be determined how value for money 
work, performance assessment and audit quality may be directed and monitored in the future 
by the NAO, the Financial Reporting Council and the professional bodies. They also pointed 
out that audit arrangements had to be determined for many new bodies formed under the Health 
and Social Care Act 2012, not least the hundreds of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). 
As a result, they suggested further research was necessary to understand the consequences of 
the reduced and fragmented oversight role and the additional services that local bodies purchase 
from auditors. Ellwood (2014) went onto highlight the inter-related problems of autonomy, 
governance, accountability and a new audit regime that needs debated much more widely not 
only for health services, but other local public bodies.  
 
Research has also highlighted areas that need further consideration in healthcare. For example, 
recently the NAO (2014) through an exploratory study looked at the link between financial 
stewardship and clinical care performance and only found a weak correlation. This needs more 
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detailed investigation. Studies have also looked at modernizing healthcare through regulatory 
hybrids, and how such partnerships employ budgeting and performance management 
(Kurunmaki and Miller, 2006, 2011) and are subject to risks (Kurunmaki and Miller, 2008). In 
addition, it is suggested that costing has been relatively neglected in healthcare research 
(Chapman and Kern, 2010), but costing practices need to be robust if they are not to undermine 
decision making in what purports to be an evidence based environment (Chapman et al., 2014). 
 
5.2 Accountability and Transparency Arrangements 
 
As its “steward”, the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament for the health service, 
including the NHS Commissioning Board (now known operationally as NHS England), Public 
Health England and adult social care. The DoH supports the Secretary of State in this role. 
There are processes for the Principal Accounting Officer at the DoH for accounting to 
Parliament, reviewing performance, holding to account NHS England’s Accounting Officer, 
CCGs Accountable Officers, and the Public Health England Accounting Officer, reporting, and 
intervention. The DCLG Accounting Officer is accountable for the allocation of adult social 
care funds to LAs. While the NHS, public health and adult social care are funded and structured 
differently, and have different mechanisms for accountability, they are to be covered by a 
consistent set of outcomes frameworks, describing the outcomes that need to be achieved. 
Collectively, these frameworks provide a means of holding the Secretary of State and the DoH 
to account for the results being achieved with its resources. 
 
The Health and Social Care Act 2012, along with other reforms, moved responsibility for 
managing the Health Service from the DoH to NHS England, which now carries out this 
function through other Arms-Length Bodies (ALBs). The DoH is now mainly responsible for 
overall design of the service, along with policy and stewardship. In terms of commissioning, 
NHS England appoint CCGs to buy in secondary care, community services, mental health 
services and rehabilitation services for their local populations. Other health care services are 
also directly commissioned by NHS England, namely primary care (including General 
Practitioner (GP) services) and specialist services such as dentistry, community pharmacy and 
primary ophthalmic services. In addition, under the new integrated public health service, 
known as Public Health England, the new Health and Well Being Boards made up of LAs, 
CCGs, LAs and local HealthWatch are responsible for Joint Strategic Needs Assessments and 
development of Joint Health and Wellbeing Strategies. 
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HMT allocate funding to the DoH budget. The DoH allocate their budget to various services, 
with most going to NHS England, and the balance used for centrally managed projects and 
services, ALB funding and public health spending. Of the allocation to NHS England a large 
proportion is passed to CCGs for local commissioned services and the remainder retained for 
nationally commissioned services. Most of the central government funds allocated to adult 
social care services are provided as part of the core grant to local government which is not ring-
fenced. Although the DoH is responsible for securing funds for adult social care through the 
Spending Review settlement it is the DCLG that is accountable for the allocation of those funds 
to LAs.   
 
Strict financial controls and accountability to the public applies to health services in accordance 
with the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, 
which repealed the Audit Commission Act 1998 (although they are not required to set a 
balanced budget as a local authority must do). Under the current arrangements, the NAO is 
responsible for the audit of the accounts of the DoH and its ALBs, including NHS England. 
Once the transitional arrangements relating to the demise of the Audit Commission are 
complete, the government plans to replace the current centralised audit system for CCGs with 
a local audit by an accredited provider. In the case of foundation trusts, each trust may choose 
to appoint an auditor from a body of accountants approved by the Secretary of State.  
 
Under the National Audit Act 1983, the NAO can examine and report on the value for money 
(assessed in terms of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness) of public spending. As with 
other local public bodies, the NAO’s programme of value for money studies in health-related 
issues and outputs provides assurances to Parliament on the extent to which the NHS and the 
DoH deliver value for money across the health care sector. These reports are generally subject 
to consideration, scrutiny and report by the PAC. For the purpose of carrying out value for 
money studies, section 8 provides a statutory right of access to information held by the DoH, 
its ALBs and all NHS bodies. 
 
The performance management regime remains centralised, but has been subject to considerable 
changes. For example, the Coalition Government discontinued the establishment and 
publication of ‘national’ Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets within central government, 
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and the abandonment of Local Area Agreements (LAAs) broke the link with local or mutually 
agreed local and central objectives and targets for public services in local communities.   
 
Monitor acts as regulator for providers of health services and the Care Quality Commission 
(CQC) is the independent regulator of all health and social care in England. The inspection 
regime is focused around the concept of annual Quality Accounts contained within Quality 
Reports, the CQC Annual Health Checks, and the planning overview and reporting 
requirements of Monitor. Initially, Quality Accounts allowed considerable discretion as to their 
content – thereby undermining benchmarking and their use for accountability, but over time 
their contents have become more proscribed and standardised. In 2013 CQC announced a broad 
aim for a ‘new’ CQC inspection regime initially in relation to hospital inspection. This involved 
returning to a system of more specialist inspection with greater involvement of staff and the 
public. Monitor’s role was also clarified as to support patient interests by promoting the 
provision of healthcare services that is economic, efficient and effective, and maintains or 
improves their quality. It does this primarily through its Risk Assessment Frameworks (RAFs) 
and its responsibility for the payments and financial systems that operate within the NHS and 
its suppliers. 
 
With regards to the planning process, a plethora of plans exist. For example, the NHS Five 
Year Forward View was published on 23 October 2014 and sets out a vision for the future of 
the NHS. In particular it sets out why change is needed, what it may look like and how it could 
be accomplished. This includes a description of various models of care that could be provided, 
and defining actions required at a local and national level to support delivery. Each year the 
DoH also sets out the outcomes and corresponding indicators in the ‘NHS Outcomes 
Framework’, which is used to hold NHS England to account for improvements in health 
outcomes. From this mandate, in 2015/16, NHS England set out its priorities for operational 
delivery through ‘The Forward View into Action: Planning for 2015/16’. This planning process 
confirms key domains, outlines progress made in refining existing measurement indicators and 
developing new indicators, and sits alongside the outcomes frameworks for adult social care 
and public health.    
 
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 and Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 resulted 
in greater fragmentation of the financial assurance, performance management and regulatory 
regimes (including arrangements for assessing value for money in the NHS and Social Care). 
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As such, these frameworks became more incoherent, less integrated across the healthcare 
system, and less amenable to public and key stakeholder scrutiny. This is partially because of 
the antecedent as multiple complex impacts of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (Murphy 
2013), the embedding of the significant change in audit and accountability arrangements 
brought about by the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, the re-structuring of the NHS, 
the impact of the various Francis reports (2013, 2015), and recent changes in the role of 
inspectorates and the focus of inspection.  
 
Working within Cabinet Office guidelines set out in 2013, NHS England publishes key 
information on transparency and openness. Building on this initiative, the government 
announced a raft of new measures aimed at increased public participation as part of its on-
going pledge to openness and transparency. They included publishing more clinician level data, 
publishing more overarching clinical indicators, extending the Friends and Family Test, and 
linking clinical data from GPs.  
 
In addition, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) provides a range of 
information services for commissioners, practitioners and managers across health, and social 
care since the Health and Social Care Act 2012. This information helps to mitigate the postcode 
lottery risk and covers clinical, public health and social care guidance, and access to medical 
publications and medicines information and prescribing support.  
 
Finally, the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) is bringing together clinical 
service and outcome data in England into one place, so that it can be linked and analysed in 
ways that will better inform the delivery of care and services. For example, the MyNHS website 
is intended to enable health and care organisations, and the public, to compare the performance 
of services over a range of measures, at both local and national level. The DoH, NHS England, 
CQC, Public Health England and the HSCIC are working together on how this site can be 
improved. Patients, academics, data intermediaries and other organisations can access data and 
make comparisons that could facilitate more informed choices. 
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5.3 Information and its Interrogation 
 
Investigation and analysis of expenditure, and other performance information, are dependent 
on NHS statistics and financial and performance databases which are available online, subject 
to privacy and ethical considerations. Given the NHS’s status as one of the world’s largest 
employers, it is unsurprising that the NHS informatics service is also one of the largest 
information systems in the public sector. It includes performance management, financial 
resilience, and value for money data. Individual NHS trusts are encouraged to share 
information as part of a ‘whole systems’ approach in the NHS – although the fragmentation 
caused by ‘Foundation’ trust status and the introduction of price competition in parts of the 
NHS is likely to make this increasingly more challenging in the future. 
 
Health provision generally relies on an evidence-based approach to treatment, and therefore 
we might expect these attitudes to be reflected in the NHS’s organisational culture, policy and 
decision-making.  Indeed, various initiatives over the last fifteen years, have sought to improve 
the quality of data systems and information, and the collection, analysis, availability, 
transparency and interrogation of NHS statistics. These include the establishment and 
development of Health Observatories that are now part of NHS England and called Public 
Health Observatories, and NHS statistical initiatives such as Rightcare and the NHS Atlas of 
Variation in Healthcare. They also include the requirement to compile and maintain Joint 
Strategic Needs Assessments for local areas that was introduced in 2005. These have been 
developed to underpin Local Area Agreements, Public Health Strategies and more recently 
Health and Wellbeing Strategies. 
 
There has been a marginal recent reduction in DoH and NHS research and evaluation capacity, 
as well as external independent research and evaluation capacity relating to performance 
management and value for money – although capacity generally remains substantial (see NICE 
and HSCIC). The loss of Audit Commission capacity has partially been compensated for by 
successor agencies such as CQC, HealthWatch, and Monitor, although there are some concerns 
about the interoperability of quality assured databases across those services that chose to 
collaborate. There also remains a large academic and independent research community 
interested in healthcare in general. As a result, unlike research and teaching focused on other 
parts of the public sector, there has been relatively little decline in interest or in the resources 
applied to researching the Health and Social Care system – not least because of the continuing 
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increase in demand for services and the significant changes to the system occasioned by the 
Health and Social Care Act 2012.  
 
However, the disappointing extent of the data compatibility, or data matching, arrangements in 
the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 could lead to a substantial reduction in the 
quality, quantity, robustness and accessibility of the compatible financial information and 
evidence available for external and public scrutiny of performance in local public services.  
 
5.4 Governance, Leadership and Strategic Alignment 
 
Given the size and multi-faceted nature of the NHS, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
governance arrangements for healthcare services are complex and opaque. However, a report 
on 10th November 2014 by the House of Commons’ Public Administration Select Committee 
was particularly scathing about statuses, roles and relationships within the sector. This raised 
concerns about how coherent, transparent, and navigable the system is for patients, and also 
suggested that overall levels of performance, quality, safety and financial resilience were 
unclear. The report described this complex situation as “not acceptable…” and noted that 
relations between the DoH and NHS England are "extremely complicated and still evolving” 
(Public Administration Select Committee, 2014). 
 
In addition, the leadership, management, systemic and cross sector strategic alignment, and 
assurance of the system at national, regional and local levels appears to be fragmented (Ham 
et al., 2015). This is despite the development of Health and Wellbeing Boards, which were 
designed to help and facilitate integration of health and social care across local communities 
(Murphy, 2013). It has also been argued that the health service now has less strategic alignment 
than previous regimes. It may also be less integrated across different healthcare systems, local 
public service delivery collaborations and emergency partnerships, and less amenable than its 
predecessors to both public and key stakeholder scrutiny. 
 
Governance, leadership and strategic alignment are critical challenges that question the 
financial sustainability of healthcare services and greatly increase the risk of widespread or 
systemic failure. These concerns therefore raise serious issues around the long term financial 
resilience of the NHS, and around the assurance that the public have a right to expect from such 
a large taxpayer-funded healthcare system.  
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5.5 Reporting, Scrutiny and Intervention 
 
The reporting, scrutiny and intervention arrangements of the NHS and the Healthcare Sector 
are notoriously complex. NHS Choices provides a clear introductory guide to ‘Health 
watchdogs and authorities’ on its website (NHS Choices, 2015), but to understand the 
arrangements in any detail requires considerable investigation of individual regulators.  
 
With regards to reporting for example, NHS bodies are internally answerable to NHS England 
and Public Health England, whereas social care services are primarily answerable to LAs, and 
public health services are answerable to both. The current external reporting, monitoring, 
inspection, regulatory and financial assurance regime is equally complex. External audit and 
inspection for both health and social care services in the public sector is administered and 
monitored externally by CQC, Monitor, HealthWatch and the Healthcare specialist regulators. 
They have periodic and specific public reporting responsibilities although there are some 
marginal differences between Foundation Trust and non-Foundation Trust reporting 
responsibilities.  
 
The current system is seen as being less transparent and less amenable to both public and key 
stakeholder scrutiny than previous arrangements. This is partly because of what sometimes 
appear to be overlapping remits for health services between CCGs’, LAs, Health and Wellbeing 
Boards, local HealthWatch and the Local Area teams of NHS England. 
 
Interventions have also been necessary in health services, largely due to the number of high 
profile serious incidents, scandals, organisational and service failures – as well as evidence of 
significant underperformance – in both health and social care services (Mid Staffordshire, 
Rotherham, etc.) over recent years. These have been accompanied by the development and 
deployment of organisational and service interventions that have built on the ‘operational 
model’ originally developed by the Local Government Interventions team as a result of CPA. 
In general terms these intervention methodologies and protocols have subsequently been 
tailored to individual services and organisations. They generally utilise teams of board and 
officer peers experienced in the governance and management of the strategic turnaround of the 
organisation or service concerned.  
 
54 
 
Both NHS England and the DoH can intervene, although the Secretary of State has a duty to 
publish reasons why either body should take this action. Reflecting the complex structure of 
the health service, NHS England can intervene in a CCG (if it believes it to be failing, or if 
there is a significant risk of a failing to discharge any of its functions), whereas the Secretary 
of State can intervene in the activities of NHS England through the DoH for various reasons.  
 
5.6 Potential Value for Money ‘Risks’ 
 
The healthcare system as a whole, and individual organisations and services within it, are 
increasingly struggling to meet centrally set objectives and targets. In recent years, a number 
of costly failures and scandals have resulted in numerous very expensive interventions.   
 
The key value for money risks for the health service are detailed below: 
 
1. A clear and increasing challenge to health, social care and childrens services is trying 
to meet rising demand.  There is also action to try and mitigate this risk. For example 
Trusts (as well as LAs through their Public Health function and the NHS in general) 
are trying to encourage people to change their behaviours (stopping smoking, more 
exercise, better diets, etc) to prevent them having to get treatment in the first place. In 
addition, the Better Care Fund is designed to reduce risk by preventing elderly and sick 
persons from entering accident and emergency departments and blocking beds, but if 
people are not primary prevented, self-caring or case managed the pressures continue 
unabated. The problem is then that funds for dealing with such cases have already been 
transferred into the Better Care Fund. 
2. The NHS reorganisation triggered by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 has made 
service provision more fragmented and complex (Ham et al., 2015). As a result, 
financial assurance and performance management systems command less confidence 
than previous regimes, which makes it more difficult to identify and address the 
financial risks to individual organisations and the healthcare system as a whole. 
3. The quality and relevance of financial and operational performance data is often poor 
and opaque. Indeed, it may even be in danger of losing the confidence of key 
stakeholders both within and outside the healthcare system, as well as the wider public. 
Furthermore, as the Mid Staffordshire inquiry found, performance management 
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systems in the health sector can be gamed to distort the true picture and hide underlying 
problems.  
4. At the same time, the Mid Staffordshire scandal may also have led inspectors to 
overcompensate by increasing their checks on quality of care. This may not be the best 
use of resources, especially during a period of rising demand for healthcare services 
and fiscal stress.  
5. As the NAO has recently reported, the regulatory bodies need to work together more 
closely and have a more integrated understanding of each other’s roles (NAO, 2014). 
6. A continuing dependence on PFI/PPP funding for any major capital investment 
schemes may be storing up risks for the future. Initiatives such as ‘Gateway’ processes 
to check the value for money of particular projects during procurement do not mitigate 
these risks entirely. Indeed, the inadequacies and inefficiencies of the PFI/PPP process 
for capital funding have received little attention lately, perhaps because of the recession 
and consequent public expenditure restrictions.  
7. Many NHS Trusts are failing to meet their cost improvement plans and quality, 
innovation, and productivity and prevention targets. Shortfalls are sometimes being met 
by non-recurrent savings. A number of Trusts also have concerns about achieving future 
savings, and almost nine out of ten did not meet sickness absence targets, which meant 
they incurred significant costs to pay for overtime and agency staff. There have been 
various steps taken to mitigate these pressures: for example, some Trusts and LAs have 
shown greater appreciation of the value and impact of volunteers in health and social 
care, and the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme introduced in 2014 agreed a 
limit on NHS spend on branded medicines, with all additional expenditure above this 
level paid for by industry for the first time. However, the amount that volunteers can 
contribute is difficult to predict with any certainty and previous price agreements have 
not proved to be as watertight as first thought. As a result, cost pressures are likely to 
continue.  
8. The House of Commons PAC (2014) has identified, that the accountability relationship 
between the DoH and NHS England is unclear. The NHS outcomes framework sits 
alongside the outcomes frameworks for adult social care and public health, both of 
which involve local government. From an accountability perspective these bodies could 
be better integrated.  
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Overall, the complex nature of health and social care provision, together with an ageing 
population that will increase the demand for services, means that there is a wide range of value 
for money risks associated with the healthcare sector. Indeed, the very fact that numerous 
organisations are involved in providing healthcare, increases the need to ‘join up’ service 
provision and therefore results in greater risks to accountability, because the nature of these 
relationships may not always be clear. 
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Section 6 Themes, Commonalities and Differences 
 
This report has identified significant changes in the nature of local public service organisations 
in England since 2010. In particular, reforms to audit and accountability arrangements, together 
with a reduction in capacity to analyse financial (and especially performance) data, have 
increased the risk that organisations from across different policy sectors may not be delivering 
optimal value for money. Other reforms, such as the Health and Social Care Act 2012, have 
resulted in an increasingly complex and fragmented landscape within specific service sectors. 
This fragmentation is requiring organisations to develop and nurture an increasing range of 
relationships with other organisations that now have responsibilities for service delivery and 
oversight, but may also obscure poor governance practices that put future services at risk. 
 
The following subsections summarise the report’s key findings, structured around the 
following key themes:  
• review of accountability and transparency literature;  
• accountability and transparency;  
• information and its interrogation;  
• governance, leadership and strategic management;  
• reporting, scrutiny and intervention; and,  
• potential value for money risks.  
 
It draws together issues that are common to each of the sectors, highlights some areas of 
difference, and identifies how contrasting approaches have shaped the nature and extent of 
value for money risks associated with local public service delivery. 
 
6.1 Review of Accountability and Transparency Literature 
 
The review of accountability and transparency literature has shown that different arrangements 
exist between the local public bodies (Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle, 2012; Ellwood, 2014; Ferry 
and Eckersley, 2015a) and that they do not necessarily react to changes in accountability and 
transparency in the same way (Hood 2010; Ferry 2015b; Ferry, Eckersley and Zakaria, 2015). 
It is therefore important that these areas are researched both separately and collectively and 
that any common evaluative framework that is introduced in practice, whether by the NAO or 
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other body, takes account of the nuanced complexities of the respective local bodies and their 
inter-relationships. 
 
6.2 Accountability and Transparency Arrangements 
 
In terms of funding, local public bodies in all four sectors are heavily reliant on central 
government funding. Although local government can levy Council Tax, this only accounts for 
a small percentage of LA budgets compared to other large European countries, and to all intents 
and purposes since 2010, any increases are capped by the Secretary of State. Similarly, local 
government has very limited scope to raise additional revenue through business rates (the 
Localism Act 2011 only permitted LAs to retain half of the receipts from new businesses 
operating within council areas). The FRS, together with police forces, also receive most of their 
income from central government: although both also levy precepts on Council Tax, the level 
of any increase is essentially restricted by the Secretary of State at DCLG. Funding for health 
services comes entirely from central government: either directly through NHS England or 
indirectly via ring-fenced public health grants provided to LAs. 
 
In spite of the heavily centralised nature of funding arrangements, accountability structures 
vary across sectors but in all sectors involve a combination of central and local arrangements. 
For example, LAs are theoretically accountable to their residents through local elections, but 
in practice central government plays a pre-eminent role in overseeing and shaping their 
activities. The picture is similar in fire and rescue, where DCLG is the most powerful actor, 
although services are also accountable to local councillors via the FRA. In the police service, 
the introduction of directly-elected PCCs has introduced a more direct local element, but the 
emergence of a more standardised national reporting system also means that forces remain 
accountable to the Home Office for many activities. The picture is most complex in the health 
sector, where foundation status means some Trusts have a different relationship with NHS 
England than others, and recent structural reforms have resulted in a much more fragmented 
and opaque organisational landscape. 
 
Similarly, there is some variation in the audit arrangements for the four policy sectors. Since 
2010, audits have concentrated largely on financial conformance (in other words, the extent to 
which bodies are able keep within their budgets), rather than operational performance (the 
extent to which they are achieving strategic objectives). In addition, LAs and fire and rescue 
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organisations are now responsible for their own performance management arrangements, and 
are no longer assessed against DCLG targets through centralised frameworks. Nonetheless, 
some other central departments, liaising closely with sponsored inspectorates and regulators 
have taken a greater interest in how their policies are implemented at the local level. In 
particular, HMIC has developed a national monitoring framework for police forces and 
performance management is also centralised under CQC and Monitor in the health sector. 
 
Since 2010, ministers have also introduced various reforms to increase the transparency of local 
public bodies. A transparency code requires both LAs and FRSs to publish various datasets 
online, including details of all transactions exceeding £500, and a similar code affects police 
forces. The picture is again more mixed in the health sector where attempts to introduce a 
standard list of datasets and publish them on a single national website have been slower to get 
off the ground. 
 
6.3 Information and its Interrogation 
 
The demise of bodies such as the Audit Commission, the Improvement and Development 
Agency and the National Policing Improvement Agency, along with a more general decline in 
performance management activity, has reduced the amount of available information relating to 
local public bodies. Nonetheless, DCLG and CIPFA continue to collect a wide range of 
financial and other data from LAs, FRSs and police forces. In addition, both the Home Office 
and HMIC collect police statistics, and the HSCIC (which is a non-departmental public body 
sponsored by DoH) does the same for health bodies. The LGA and CIPFA provide 
benchmarking facilities for LA services – although in most cases access to these performance-
related data is restricted to participants and is only available via subscription.  
 
However, the capacity to interrogate these data sets has been reduced in every sector since 
2010. In particular, the abolition of the Audit Commission has meant that far fewer experts are 
devoted to analysing financial and performance information related to LAs and fire and rescue 
bodies – although HMIC is filling in some of these gaps for the police service. Unsurprisingly, 
the Audit Commission’s professional auditors have not been replaced by ‘armchair 
enthusiasts’. Furthermore, the capacity of external bodies (in universities, for example) is also 
limited (and falling). This is less of a concern in the health sector, where independent capacity 
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(in the form of NICE, HSCIC, universities and ‘think tanks’) remains strong and the Audit 
Commission did not have such a dominant role. 
 
As a result of the decline in capacity, there is far less evidence available in general, and quality-
assured compatible evidence in particular, to inform and assist LAs and FRSs in decision-
making, although HMIC ensures that police forces are provided with some relevant data. 
Nonetheless, this represents a clear risk to value for money in local public services, since it will 
be increasingly difficult to identify whether decision-makers have chosen the most appropriate 
courses of action.  
 
There is much less of a concern in the health sector, where capacity remains high and a longer 
tradition of evidence-based decision-making prevails. 
 
6.4 Governance, Leadership and Strategic Development 
 
Governance arrangements in LAs have remained relatively stable over the last five years: 
proposals to introduce further elected mayors were rejected by most cities in local referenda 
and a 2012 update to the CIPFA/SOLACE Good Governance Framework only made minor 
changes to the 2007 version. 
 
However, the other three sectors have all undergone significant reform. In FRSs, the demise of 
the Audit Commission has required the CFOA to take a more leading role, whereas the 
introduction of PCCs has changed the way in which police forces are governed. Structural 
reforms to health services have also altered governance structures resulting in more complex, 
opaque and potentially incoherent arrangements across the country. 
 
These changes have had a significant impact on leadership and strategic alignment, particularly 
outside LAs. In the FRS, the CFOA has struggled to prevent fragmentation and to co-ordinate 
the activities of service delivery bodies more effectively. Similarly, reforms in health have led 
to a fracturing of leadership and made strategic alignment more difficult, in spite of the 
introduction of cross-organisational Health and Wellbeing Boards.  
 
In contrast, recent sectoral leadership for LAs and police forces has been more focussed 
through the LGA and the governance framework, and through the recent role of HMIC 
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respectively. This results in both sectors having a bit more strategic alignment than fire and 
rescue or health services. 
 
6.5 Reporting, Scrutiny and Intervention 
 
All four sectors continue to report to the relevant central government departments: for LAs and 
fire and rescue bodies this is DCLG, for police forces this is the Home Office, and for health 
services this is DoH and NHS England. In some cases this is also done through intermediaries, 
such as HMIC or the CQC, and health service bodies also report to LAs about their public 
health activities.  
 
However, scrutiny is carried out mostly at the local level. In addition to internal services, 
councils’ overview and scrutiny committees have responsibilities to investigate some services 
that sit outside the remit of LAs. Other bodies, such as FRAs (in the fire service) and PCCs and 
PCPs (for police forces) also have a role in local scrutiny. The picture in the health sector is 
more mixed, with the CCGs’, LAs, Health and Wellbeing Boards, local HealthWatch and the 
Local Area teams of NHS England having what sometimes appear to be overlapping remits. 
 
The relevant Secretary of State has the power to intervene in all four sectors, although they 
must consult with local actors and follow established codes. In practice, any local body that is 
experiencing difficulties is more likely to ask others within the sector for assistance, and rely 
on other local actors and sector bodies to initiate improvements. This approach follows a model 
that has evolved from previous interventions in LAs. However, DCLG is legally able to 
intervene in LAs and fire and rescue bodies, and the Home Office and DoH also have this 
power for police forces and health services respectively. Some research sponsored by the LGA 
has recently been published (Bennett et al., 2014), and further reviews are underway (Murphy 
and Jones, forthcoming).  
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6.6 Potential Value for Money ‘Risks’ 
 
This report identified how recent reforms to local public bodies over the last five years have 
increased value for money risks in all four sectors. In LAs, a key risk over the medium term is 
service failure: as the NAO (2014) has already identified, budgetary constraints may mean that 
some LAs no longer have sufficient resources to deliver statutory services. However, the 
underlying culture of budgetary stewardship, together with the legal requirement that each LA 
must produce a balanced revenue budget, means that financial considerations are likely to take 
precedence over service delivery. Budgetary constraints in fire and rescue similarly pose a risk 
to service delivery, as indeed they do in police forces and the health service.  
 
More generally, the fact that all local public service bodies have very little control over their 
income streams means that they are not always able to respond to developments quickly by 
directing resources to wherever they may be required. Related to this, the Local Audit and 
Accountability Act 2014, as well as the continued reliance on PFI/PPP for capital investment, 
means that budgetary planning in LAs, fire and rescue bodies and police forces does not take 
sufficient account of long-term financial sustainability. 
 
In addition, various structural reforms have increased risks associated with value for money. 
Specifically in the health sector, the restructuring triggered by the Health and Social Care Act 
2012 has resulted in complex and fragmented arrangements that make accountability 
relationships unclear. Similarly, the abolition of centralised performance frameworks in local 
government and FRSs risks obscuring problems with service delivery and quality, since bodies 
are no longer required to monitor and publically report against clearly articulated and/or 
common targets. 
 
The decline in standardised performance management arrangements since 2010 has been 
accompanied by a corresponding drop in capacity to analyse public data and support evidence-
based decision-making. The abolition of the Audit Commission has not only meant that local 
residents and government ministers no longer have an independent check on how their council 
is performing, but officers within public bodies, academic institutions and consultants in 
general have a relative lack of publicly available and comparable information. 
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In this way, the biggest risk to optimising value for money in local services may actually be 
the fact that managers no longer have sufficient tools to identify where risks might exist, and 
therefore cannot take economic, efficient and effective action to mitigate them. To paraphrase 
the former US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the number of “unknown unknowns” has 
increased markedly over the last five years, and this could have significant implications for the 
long-term financial health of local public service bodies.  
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